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ABSTRACT
In this paper we introduce and describe a novel approach to adaptive image steganography which
is combined with One-Time Pad encryption, and demonstrate the software which implements this
methodology. Testing using the state-of-the-art steganalysis software tool StegExpose concludes
the image hiding is reliably secure and undetectable using reasonably-sized message payloads
(≤25% message bits per image pixel; bpp). Payload image file format outputs from the software
include PNG, BMP, JP2, JXR, J2K, TIFF, and WEBP. A variety of file output formats is
empirically important as most steganalysis programs will only accept PNG, BMP, and possibly
JPG, as the file inputs.
Keywords: steganography, one-time pad, steganalysis, information hiding, digital forensics

INTRODUCTION
In this paper we introduce a comprehensive
steganography software system and platform
framework based on One-Time Pad (OTP)
encryption
and
adaptive
steganography
technology.
We
provide
usage
recommendations and advice guidelines. The
system is tested and shown to be resistant to
many common steganalysis attacks. In the
context of this paper we are assumed advocate
of the steganographer; someone who may be a
political dissident in an oppressive regime, a
religiously persecuted individual, a friendly
agent engaging in covert communication, or a
lawful
individual
desiring
complete
© 2016 ADFSL

communication
privacy,
compelling examples.

among

other

BACKGROUND
Steganography
Steganography,
the
art
of
invisible
communication, is achieved by hiding secret
data inside a carrier file such as an image.
After hiding the secret data, the carrier file
should appear unsuspicious so that the very
existence of the embedded data is concealed. A
major drawback to encryption is that the
existence of the message data are not hidden.
Data that has been encrypted, although
unreadable, still exists as a suspicion-arousing
Page 131
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file transfer. If given enough time, once alerted,
someone could potentially decrypt the data or
derive other intelligence regarding either
sender or receiver. A solution to this problem
is steganography; this is the ancient art of
hiding messages so that they are not
detectable.
In steganography, the possible cover carriers
are unsuspicious appearing files (images, audio,
video, text, or some other digitally
representative code) which will hold the hidden
information. A message is the information
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hidden and may be plaintext, cipher text,
images, or anything that can be embedded into
a bit stream. Together the cover carrier and
the embedded message create a stego-carrier.
Hiding information may require a stego key
which is additional secret information, such as
a password or OTP key, required for
embedding the information. For example, when
a secret message is hidden within a cover
image, the resulting product is a stego-image.
A possible formula of the process may be
represented as: cover medium + embedded
message + stego key = stego-medium

Figure 1. Graphical Version of a Steganographic System.

fE: steganographic function "embedding".
fE-1: steganographic function "extracting".
cover: cover data in which emb will be hidden.
emb: message file to be hidden.
stego: cover data with the hidden message.
The advantage of steganography is that it
can be used to secretly transmit messages
without the fact of the transmission being
discovered. Often, using encryption might
identify the sender or receiver as someone with
something to hide. It is believed that
steganography was first practiced during the
Golden Age in Greece. An ancient Greek
record describes the practice of melting wax off
wax tablets used for writing messages and then
inscribing a message in the underlying wood.
The wax was then reapplied to the wood,
giving the appearance of a new, unused tablet.
The resulting tablets could be conveniently
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transported without anyone suspecting the
presence of a message beneath the wax.

LSB Steganography
The
simplest
and
popular
image
steganographic method is the least significant
bit (LSB) substitution. It embeds messages
into cover image by replacing the least
significant bits directly. The hiding capacity
can be increased by using up to 4 least
significant bits (one each for Red, Green, Blue,
and Alpha color channels, respectively) in each
pixel. It has a common weak point i.e. the
sample value changes asymmetrically. When
the LSB of cover medium sample value is equal
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to the message bit, no change is made.
Otherwise the value 2n is changed to 2n+1 or
2n+1 is changed to 2n. There are many
improvements and modifications that have
been proposed to strengthen this technique,
such as adaptive techniques that alter payload
distribution based on image characteristics. If
the message is first encrypted and then
embedded, the security is enhanced.
2.3 One-Time Pad
The "one-time pad" encryption algorithm
was invented in the early 1900s and has since
been proven as unbreakable. The one-time pad
algorithm is derived from a previous cipher
called Vernam Cipher, named after Gilbert
Vernam. The Vernam Cipher was a cipher that
combined a message with a key read from a
paper tape or pad. The Vernam Cipher was
not unbreakable until Joseph Mauborgne
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recognized that if the key was completely
random the cryptanalytic difficultly would be
equal to attempting every possible key (Kahn,
1996). Even when trying every possible key,
one would still have to review each attempt at
decipherment to see if the proper key was
used. The unbreakable aspect of the one-time
pad comes from two assumptions: the key used
is completely random and the key cannot be
used more than once. The security of the onetime pad relies on keeping the key secret and
using each key only once.
The one-time pad is typically implemented
by using exclusive-or (XOR) addition to
combine plaintext elements with key elements.
An example of this is shown in Figure 2. The
key used for encryption is also used for
decryption. Applying the same key to the
ciphertext results in the output of the original
plaintext.

Figure 2. Example of a One-Time Pad implementation using XOR addition.

OTP is immune even to unlimited
resources brute-force attacks. Trying all keys
simply yields all possible plaintexts, all equally
likely to be the actual plaintext. Even with
known plaintext, such as part of the message
being known, bruteforce attacks cannot be
used, since an attacker is unable to gain any
information about the parts of the key needed
to decrypt the rest of the message.

© 2016 ADFSL

METHODOLOGY
The following describes the general method
implemented in the software for key
generation, encryption, embedding, message
transfer, and decryption.

General Method
1. Random image keys are generated
using a key generator program. The key
generator program generates one-time
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2.

3.

4.

5.

pad keys that consist of random colored
pixels. Each random colored pixels
consists of random values for red,
green, and blue colors throughout the
image. One image key is generated for
every message that is intended to be
sent.
To encrypt a message, a cover image
and random key image is selected. Each
pixel in the cover image is XOR'ed
with the key image X, Y coordinate
pixel. Each pixel consists of a 32-bit
long integer color value. One byte each
corresponds to red, green, and blue
components, respectively. The XOR'ed
pixel values are then adjusted to hide
the message. The bytes in the message
are divided up into bits — one bit per
pixel. The least significant bit (LSB) in
the XOR'ed pixel colors are then
adjusted to hide the message. Bit
values that do not correspond are
adjusted (in general, 50% of the values
will already be set correctly). LSBs for
red, green, or blue are selected based on
a local pixel variation score, contingent
if the sum of the RGB LSBs are even
or odd (even corresponds to a 0 bit,
odd to a 1 bit).
At this point, the newly derived color
values are XOR'ed once again with the
random image key to generate color
values very close to the original image.
These pixel color values will be used to
construct the steganographic image
that will be sent to the receiver.
Ideally at this point, both the original
cover image and the senders copy of
the random image key can be destroyed
(forensically wiped from the hard drive
using a file erasure procedure). This is
to prevent later detection and
statistical comparisons.
Upon receipt of the steganographic
image, the receiver loads the intended
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image key and XOR's each pixel of the
steganographic
image
with
its
respective corresponding X, Y pixel in
the image key. This will derive a series
of bit values that correspond to the
plaintext message. The bits can be
reassembled into bytes (and later 2byte
Unicode
characters)
that
correspond to the plaintext message.
6. The start and end of the message are
delimited by randomly chosen 10character delimiting strings that are
embedded as EXIF comments into the
random image key by the key generator
program. Thus, random message
padding is incorporated at the start
and end of messages.
7. The random image key also contains a
random number seed, this is used for
the
random
number
generator
algorithm in use, and starts the
generator at the proper sequence start
value.

Random Number Generation
A cryptographically secure pseudo-random
number generator (CSPRNG) or cryptographic
pseudorandom number generator (CPRNG) is
a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)
with properties that make it suitable for use in
cryptography. Ideally, the generation of
random numbers in CSPRNGs uses entropy
obtained from a high-quality source, which
might be a hardware random number
generator or perhaps unpredictable system
processes — though unexpected correlations
have been found in several such ostensibly
independent
processes.
Several
robust
CPRNGs
are
incorporated
into
the
steganography software.
Mersenne Twister
The Mersenne Twister is a pseudorandom
number generator (PRNG). It is by far the
most widely used general-purpose PRNG. Its
© 2016 ADFSL
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name derives from the fact that its period
length is chosen to be a Mersenne prime. The
Mersenne Twister was developed in 1997 by
Makoto Matsumoto and Takuji Nishimura. It
was designed specifically to rectify most of the
flaws found in older PRNGs. It was the first
PRNG to provide fast generation of highquality pseudorandom integers. The most
commonly used version of the Mersenne
Twister algorithm is based on the Mersenne
19937−1
prime
2
.
The
standard
library
implementation of this, MT19937, uses a 32-bit
word length. There is another implementation
that uses a 64-bit word length, MT19937-64,
that generates a different sequence. The
software implements a cryptographically secure
version of the Mersenne Twister provided by
the algorithm authors Matsumoto and
Nishimura.
Other Random Number
Generators
Optional random number generator selections
included in the OTP-Steg key generator
program include the following (each of these
can be optionally selected by the user):


ISAAC —
ISAAC (indirection,
shift, accumulate, add, and count)
is a cryptographically secure
pseudorandom number generator
and a stream cipher designed by
Robert J. Jenkins, Jr. in 1996.



CryptGenRandom
—
CryptGenRandom
is
a
cryptographically
secure
pseudorandom number generator
function that is included in
Microsoft's
Cryptographic
Application Programming Interface.
In Win32 programs, Microsoft
recommends its use anywhere
random number generation is
needed.

© 2016 ADFSL
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RtlGenRandom — On a default
Windows XP and later install,
CryptGenRandom calls into a
function
named
ADVAPI32!RtlGenRandom, which
does not require one to load all the
CryptAPI classes for usage.



Rnd() — Standard API random
number
generator
(for
research/testing purposes only – it
is not cryptographically secure).

Key Generation
Key Delimiters
Upon key generation, a pair of key delimiters is
also randomly chosen of 10 Unicode characters
each for the start delimiter and end delimiter,
respectively. These are used to indicate to the
decryption program exactly where the message
starts, and where it ends. Random padding is
added to both ends of the message — the start
and the end of the message embedded in the
payload file. The key delimiters identify where
to start the message text, and where to cut it
short at the end of the message. These key
delimiters are contained in the EXIF image
comment data in the key file. No EXIF
comment data whatsoever is contained in the
payload file. Also, the key delimiter values are
utilized for random number generation seed
data used for encryption and decryption.

Expert System to Evaluate
and Score Candidate Cover
Images
It is well known from the literature that some
cover images present much better candidates
for steganographic security than others based
on image characteristics. Typically, cover
images with a high degree of pixel color
variation, very few saturated white or black
pixels, and few pixels next to each other of the
same color, are excellent payload candidates.
We implement an expert system to give the
Page 135
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software user immediate knowledge of how
good a candidate a potential color image is for
detection security. We have incorporated a
tentative scoring system that evaluates images
based on several factors. The output score
ranges from 0 to 100%, with greater than 90%
score being a good candidate for a cover image.
Scores of 80-90% are marginal, and less than
80% are considered not adequate. In the
current preliminary version, a peak signal-tonoise ratio (PSNR) versus a solid color image
is calculated. This rating is given a weighting
of 25% in the overall score. Also, the number
of same color pixels next to each other is given
a weighting of 25% for up to 5% of the image
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pixels (in other words, a 5% of the image
pixels are same color next to each other, this
rating would be zero). Thirdly, a weighted
rating of 25% is given to the number of white
pixels, up to 5%. The same weighting is also
calculated for black pixels. Each of the four
factors is combined for the rating from 0% up
to 100%. Ideally, a cover image will have zero
white pixels, zero black pixels, very few colors
next to each other that are the same, and a
very high variation in color over comparison to
a solid color image. Table 1 below lists the
above and additional cover image scoring
factors that could be evaluated in an expert
system rating scheme.

© 2016 ADFSL
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Table 1
Potential Candidate Image Scoring Factors.

Factor

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

Description

Value

PSNR over solid color

Peak signal-to-noise ratio of
image to solid color image.

Higher values are better.

Percentage of saturated colors

Portion of the image that is
either all-white or all black.

Lower values are better.

Percentage of nearby same Portion of image that has
colors
neighboring pixels of the same
color.

Lower values are better.

Randomness of LSB's

Higher randomness is better.

Random
distribution

RGB

LSB Randomness of each color
channel.

RS test on Cover Image

Chi-squared test
Image

Measures of randomness of the
distribution of the significant
bits.

Clean RS test on cover image.

Higher values are better.
Lower values are better —
indicates less probability of a
threshold being reached after
encoding.

on Cover Clean Chi-square test on cover Lower values are better.
image.

Pure Photograph

Photo has not previously been
compression encoded using
algorithm like JPEG.

Straight from a high-quality
digital camera is best.

Original Photograph

No other copies of the photo
exist in clean or altered state
that can be used for
comparison.

Known source and originality
is best here.

Dimensions

It is well known that
extremely large images have
less pixel color variation and
steganography here is more
easily detected.

Approximate pixel dimensions
of images frequently found on
the Internet are best — about
1600×1200 or less pixels.

Future Security = Small
Payloads
To ensure robustness against potential future
attacks we have limited payload relative sizes.
The high limit for the bits-per-pixel pixel is
approximately 25%. And since only half of
pixels are typically altered based on the
message, this corresponds to a practical limit
© 2016 ADFSL

of about 12.5% pixel alteration. By limiting the
pixel bit payload, it quite robustly limits
detectability now and in the future. Extremely
advanced statistical detection techniques are
being promulgated that are improving the odds
of successfully detecting steganography efforts.
There is no guarantee that these steganalysis
efforts will not double or triple in effectiveness
in the next few years. As a safety measure and
Page 137
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margin of security, payload size is strictly
limited by the software to an amount that
should be reasonably safe for the foreseeable
future. This equals future security for messages
that may be encrypted today and subsequently
intercepted and archived for several years for
later decipherment.

Steganalysis
Steganalysis is "the process of detecting
steganography by looking at variances between
bit patterns and statistical norms." It is the
art of discovering and revealing covert
messages. The goal of steganalysis is to
identify
suspected
information
streams,
determine whether or not they have hidden
messages encoded into them, and, if possible,
recover the hidden information. Unlike
cryptanalysis, where it is evident that
intercepted encrypted data contains a message,
steganalysis generally starts with several
suspect information streams but uncertainty
whether any of these contain hidden message.
The steganalyst starts by reducing the set of
suspect information streams to a subset of
most likely altered information streams. This is
usually done with statistical analysis using
advanced statistics techniques.
Analyzing repetitive patterns may reveal
the identification of a steganography tool or
hidden information. To inspect these patterns
an approach is to compare the original cover
image with the stego image and note visible
differences. This is called a known-carrier
attack. By comparing numerous images, it is
possible that patterns emerge as signatures to
a steganography tool. Another visual clue to
the presence of hidden information is padding
or cropping of an image. With some
steganographic tools if an image does not fit
into a fixed size it is cropped or padded with
black spaces. There may also be a difference in
the file size between the stego-image and the
cover image. Another indicator is a large
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increase or decrease in the number of unique
colors, or colors in a palette which increase
incrementally rather than randomly. These are
just examples among the many published and
effective approaches.
StegExpose is a steganalysis tool specialized
in detecting LSB (least significant bit)
steganography in lossless images such as PNG
and BMP. It has a command line interface and
is designed to analyze images in bulk while
providing
reporting
capabilities
and
customization which is comprehensible for non
forensic experts. The StegExpose rating
algorithm is derived from an intelligent and
thoroughly tested combination of pre-existing
pixel based steganalysis methods including
Sample Pairs by Dumitrescu (2003), RS
Analysis by Fridrich (2001), Chi-Square
Attack by Westfeld (2000), and Primary Sets
by Dumitrescu (2002). In addition to detecting
the presence of steganography, StegExpose also
features
the
quantitative
steganalysis
(determining the length of the hidden
message).
We
utilize
StegExpose
for
steganalysis to test the software reliability in
hiding messages effectively from steganalysis.

Performance Speed and
Robust Steganography
The straightforwardness of the embedding
algorithm has also resulted in the good
embedding speed. Most of the files worked
with using the software take less than 60 to 90
seconds for embedding. Typically, about 30
seconds is required for decryption. Since the
bit per pixel payload is less than 25%, the
random number generator does not have to
repeatedly struggle to find empty pixels that
have not been previously encoded.

SOFTWARE
IMPLEMENTATION
The software implementation consists of three
executable files: a key generator program, an
© 2016 ADFSL
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encryption program, and a decryption
program. The encryption program has image
analysis functions and windows built-in to aid
in cover image categorization.

Key Generation

CDFSL Proceedings 2016
A screenshot of the key generation program is
shown below. The key generation program
constructs image keys of random colored pixels
according to the user preference for size and
file naming. Up to five previously discussed
random number generators can be chosen from
to generate the random colored pixels.

Figure 4. Key Generator executable program.

Encryption and Embedding
The encryption program has by wide margin
the most features and functionality built-in.
Also included are functions for deleting and
forensically-wiping the key file used for
encryption, as well as the original cover image.

© 2016 ADFSL

By comparing the encrypted payload file to an
original cover image, steganography could
easily be detected as the difference between the
two images. It is an extremely important
security measure to eliminate the original cover
image and key as soon as possible after
encryption takes place.
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Figure 5. Encrypt/Embed executable program.

Message Hash Value
SHA-256 values of the message are calculated
in both the encryption and decryption steps. In
the encryption step, the hashed value is
incorporated into the end of the message
string. Upon decryption, the transmitted hash
value is compared to the hashed value of the
decrypted message, and displayed in the
decryption program graphical user interface. If
the values match, the user is informed that the
message has not been altered in any way since
it was encrypted by the sender. This is also a
double check that successful decryption has
taken place and the message is authentic.

Text Compression
Compression prior to embedding the message
generally reduces message size by 50 to 80%.
Page 140

The zLib compression library DLL is utilized
and called as a function within both the
encrypt and decrypt programs. The result
makes encryption and decryption quicker and
also has the benefit of reducing the bit per
pixel payload size in the cover image,
increasing security against detection.

4.5 Cover and Key File
Deletion and Forensic Data
Wiping
File wiping utilities are used to delete
individual files from an operating system
mounted drive. The advantage of file wiping
utilities is that they can accomplish their task
in a relatively short amount of time as opposed
to disk cleaning utilities which take much
longer and must be run separately.
© 2016 ADFSL
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Built-In Cover and Stego
Image Analysis Tools
Several image statistical analysis features are
built into the encryption program. Peak signalto-noise ratio (PSNR), RS, Chi-Squared, LSB
visual analysis, color changes, and color
variations. The distortion in the stego-image
can be measured by parameters such as mean
square error (MSE) and peak signal-to-noise
ratio (PSNR) (see Equation 1 and 2 below),
and correlation. The lesser distortion means,
the lesser MSE, but higher PSNR. If p is a
M×N grayscale image and q is its stego-image,
then the MSE and PSNR values are computed
using (1) and (2). For color images a pixel
comprises 3 or 4 bytes. Each byte can be
treated as a pixel and the same equations can
be used to calculate the MSE and PSNR.

The software image analysis window in the
encryption program is shown below. Using this
window, several operations can be performed
to
estimate
effectiveness
of
message

CDFSL Proceedings 2016
embedding. Least significant bit (LSB) color
values can be investigated visually. Shown on
the right of the analysis window are the least
significant bit values of the photo on the left.
If the least significant bit for red, green,
and/or blue is set, this color is added at full
intensity to the respective pixel in the image
on the right. In Figure 7, individual least
significant bit color values can be investigated
as well in the red, green, and blue channels. In
this image it is obvious there is a problem with
the blue channel — the sky has full intensity
for all values. Encoding message data here
would be risky, as the pixel variation is
nonexistent. Steganography would be very
easily detected by any encoding in this area.
As a result, the software spreads out the
message embedding adaptively, and ignores the
blue channel in the area of the sky. Since the

red channel has the most random variation
throughout the image, it carries the largest
brunt of the payload, leveraging its random
character throughout the image.

Figure 6. Image Analysis window, cover image on left, LSB analysis on the right.

© 2016 ADFSL
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Figure 7. Analysis LSB color analysis graphics (Red, Green, Blue, All Colors).

Shown below are the variations in the red
channel, the blue channel in Figure 9 shows
the lack of variation in the sky area.

Figure 8. Red channel variation score (normalized to 0-255).
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Figure 9. Blue channel variation score (normalized to 0-255).

In Figure 10 below, the pixel least
significant bit encodings are shown. Notice
that in the area of the sky, only red pixels are
encoded in the least significant bit. Other areas
of the image vary between green and blue
embedding depending on which color has the

© 2016 ADFSL

most variation in that pixel general area.
Figure 11 shows a blowup of the pixel least
significant coding in the area of the transition
between the trees and the sky. Notice that the
pixel encodings shift from primarily blue-green
to the red color at this transition.
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Figure 10. Pixel LSB modification encodings (Red, Green, or Blue).

Figure 11. Figure 10 "Blow-Up": Pixel LSB encodings (Red, Green, or Blue).

The decryption process largely reverses the
encryption process using the decryption
program. A SHA-256 hash value is computed
from the decrypted message and compared to
the hashed value contained within the payload
file. If the two values match, the hashed value
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is presented with a green colored background.
If not, the background is reddish. A green
value indicates to the receiver that the message
has not been altered in any way since it was
written.
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Figure 12. Decrypt/Extract executable program.

USAGE
RECOMMENDATIONS
Photo selection
There are several general guidelines for photo
image selection to increase security. Original
photos taken with the user's own camera
should be selected as cover images. This is to
ensure that the duplicate of the original photo
does not exist somewhere on the Internet for
comparison. The photo should never have
previously been encoded to JPEG to ensure

full CMOS pixel sensor color variations
throughout
the
image.
As mentioned
previously, once these criteria are satisfied, the
user can evaluate an encodability score that is
calculated by the encryption program that
ranges from 0 to 100%.

Encodability Score
The user should choose in general images that
score above 90% for encodability to enhance
steganalysis security. The following is the
weighting breakdown for the encodability
score:

25% Overall PSNR (dB) variation score (0-100%) (more color variation = higher score)
25% Same colors next to each other (0-5%) (less same colors = higher score)
25% Black pixels (0-5%) (less black = higher score)
25% White pixels (0-5%) (less white = higher score)
100% - (100-90% = OK, 90-80% = Marginal, <80% = Unacceptable)

© 2016 ADFSL
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Recommended
Steganographic Practices
Table 2
Recommended Steganographic Practices.

No.

Practice

Description

1

Steganography software should be operated on a computer that is
Software not connected to any network or the Internet. Files should be
Operation transferred using write only media such as DVD or CD, or less
securely by USB drive.

2

Only original photos taken by the users’ high-quality camera
should be considered as cover images. This is to ensure that the
image does not have duplicates available on the Internet. Use
Original Photos
RAW (original camera file format) images where possible. The
software directly accepts all RAW image file types including Nikon,
Canon, Sony, etc.

3

The software should be run off of a USB drive plugged into the
Software USB isolated computer. Further, USB drive containing software, keys,
Loaded and cover images should be located separately from the isolated
computer in a safe and secure location.

4

The isolated computer used to run the software should be wellsecured and not networked in any way. The operating system
Isolated
should be directly installed from DVD, and antivirus and checks
Computers
for malware should be regularly run to ensure there is no keystroke
loggers, rootkits, or other security compromises installed.

5

Both sender and receiver should have their own set of unique keys.
"To" and Sender A to B, and B to A, each use their own one-way key series.
"From" Keys This is to prevent key reuse. Each key must be used only one time,
and one time only. Security using OTP depends on this precept.

6

Key exchange should take place upon physical meeting using write
only media such as DVD or CD. Key exchange must not take place
Exchanging Keys over a network. Keys should be securely generated on isolated
computers. Keys must be stored on removable USB drives separate
from the isolated computer.

7

All files including cover image files and key files should be
forensically deleted and wiped once used. Forensic wiping utilities
Deleting Files in the encryption and decryption programs can be used for this
purpose. Wiping consists of randomly overwriting the previous file
seven times with random data.
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No.

Practice

CDFSL Proceedings 2016
Description

8

Encrypted files should be sent as anonymously as possible. Direct
email exchange should be avoided. A preferable alternative is to
Sending upload files periodically to gallery websites which have potentially
Encrypted Files thousands of viewers and downloaders daily. Identifying the specific
receiver will be difficult in this situation. Each sender should
upload to a different anonymous gallery.

9

It should be known that just the act of plugging in a USB drive
into a Windows computer creates a digital trail throughout the
Monitoring system registry. Installing software using a setup program also
Windows creates numerous records within the operating system registry. As
Vulnerabilities a result, the software should be run off of a USB drive without
running a separate install/setup utility. Windows must be isolated
off of any network to ensure malware is not installed.

10

Malware can cause a compromise in the steganography system at
any time. A keystroke logger that is uploading typed messages is
an instant fail. Users must be extremely cautious and
knowledgeable about potential malware threats before using the
Malware
software. In particular, any networked computer presents a point of
vulnerability — the software and keys must never be used here.
Only transfer of files previously encrypted on an isolated computer
can be conducted over a network.

11

The biggest limitation is the human factor. Operational security
must be observed that all times in addition to technical security.
Usage
This means aggressive securing of the USB drive use for the
Limitations
software and keys, as well as limited knowledge by parties
involved. People should be informed on a need-to-know basis only.

13

For further security, keys can be encrypted for storage. As a result
Encrypted Keys they will not be able to be used unless the user has knowledge of
the encryption key.

14

Original photos must be deleted and erased from the camera,
Wipe Original
storage medium, and USB drive as soon as possible after they are
Photos
used.

15

Wipe Used Keys Keys must be deleted and erased as soon as they are used.

16

Internet The computer connected to the Internet must be clean of viruses
Computer and malware or keystroke loggers. Special care must be taken in
"Clean" this area.

17

The photo CMOS sensor output profile can be mapped to a
particular individual camera. Photo sent on the Internet can be
Camera Secured
matched up to the users’ camera. As a result, an effort should be
made to keep the camera secure.

18

File Upload File upload galleries should be selected for anonymity and high
Galleries traffic volume.
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19

Carefully Cover images should be conforming to high encodability statistics
Selected Cover and originality. Also they should be of subject matter that will not
Images raise any suspicions.

20

Various image file formats can be chosen, leveraging the fact that
Image File steganalysis software will not run on many different types of image
Format file types. Take advantage of other lossless file formats besides
PNG and BMP such as TIF, J2K, EXR, WEBP, and JXR.

21

1: Keep software and keys in secure locations on USB drives. 2: Use
software on isolated computer not connected to Internet. 3: Use
Must-Dos
keys and photos only once and be sure to erase files as soon as
possible, especially original cover images and keys.

Steganographic
Communication Security State
Level Estimation

We envision certain levels of steganographic
communication
security
levels
that
correspondents can use for planning, analysis,
and security estimations. Thresholds can be
established for protective measures using these
security level guidelines.

Table 3
Notional Steganographic Security Levels.

Security
Level
10
9

Name

Description

Impact

Communication commencing securely. Operational
Secure security and human threat and insider threat must None — success
be strongly monitored and evaluated here.
Communication Authorities
suspect
communication
Suspected knowledge of sender and receiver.

without

Low

8

Steg Statistically Positive steganography screening results indicating
Moderate
Detected further investigation.

7

If proper security measures recommended previously
Internet
are followed, nothing should be derived. Duress
Computer
Moderate
code-word should be immediately used and
Searched
communication ceased.

6

Transmitted If proper procedures are used, locating these files
Moderate
Files Discovered should not present much evidence.

5

Software
Traces of software use should be detectable in
Computer
High
Windows registry.
Discovered
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Security
Level
4

Name
Steg Known

1

Description

Impact

Investigators conclude illicit communication has
High
taken place, without acquiring USB drive(s).

USB Drive User should make efforts to
discovered communication is compromised.

3
2

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

inform

receiver

Severe

Software
Knowledge of message text should be assumed at
Discovered/
Severe
this point.
Acquired
Key(s) acquired Complete security compromise.

Severe

Suspect All communicating parties should make efforts to
Failure
Detained destroy any remaining evidence.

0

Communicators should have a procedure in
place to indicate ceasing of messages and also
to destroy related software and keys
systematically.
Steganographers
should
consider
incorporating a duress code-word into their
communication security protocol. The duress
code-word should be a predetermined word or
phrase that indicates to the receiving party
that communication security has been
compromised. For example, capture by
authorities may have created a situation where
one party is succumbing to efforts to be
"turned." The duress code word indicates such
a situation and should be carefully chosen to
arouse no suspicion should authorities have
knowledge of its inclusion in a "trap" message.

Software Availability
The software is available as a free educational
and research download to be used for digital
forensics education and related projects. Please
feel free to use the software for your own
educational and research purposes. The
software
can
be
acquired
here:
http://199.175.52.196/OTP-Steg/.

© 2016 ADFSL

STEGANALYSIS
RESULTS
StegExpose is a Java based steganalysis tool
heavily geared towards bulk analysis of lossless
images. It is a steganalysis tool specialized in
detecting
LSB
(least
significant
bit)
steganography in lossless images such as PNG
and BMP. It has a command line interface and
is designed to analyze images in bulk while
providing
reporting
capabilities
and
customization which is comprehensible for nonforensic experts. The StegExpose rating
algorithm is derived from an intelligent and
thoroughly tested combination of pre-existing
pixel-based steganalysis methods. Two new
fusion detectors, standard and fast fusion were
derived from four well-known steganalysis
methods and successfully implemented in the
tool. Standard fusion is more accurate than
any of the component detectors from which it
is derived.
The following LSB steganalysis methods
have been incorporated in StegExpose. RS
analysis (Fridrich, Goljan, & Du, 2001) detects
randomly scattered LSB embedding in
grayscale and color images by inspecting the
differences in the number of regular and
singular groups for the LSB and "shifted" LSB
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plane. Sample pair analysis (Dumitrescu, Wu,
& Wang, 2003) is based on a finite state
machine whose states are selected multisets of
sample
pairs
called
trace
multisets
(Dumitrescu, Wu, & Wang 2003). The chisquare attack (Westfeld & Piltzmann, 2000) is
a statistical analysis of pairs of values (PoVs)
exchanged during LSB embedding. PoVs are
groups of binary values within an object's
LSBs. Primary sets (Dumitrescu, Wu, &
Memon, 2002) are based on a statistical
identity related to certain sets of pixels in an
image. The difference histogram analysis
(Zhang & Ping, 2003) is a statistical attack on
an
image's
histogram,
measuring
the
correlation between the least significant and all

other bit planes. Two new fusion detectors,
standard and fast fusion, were derived from
four well-known steganalysis methods and
successfully implemented in the tool. The
standard fusion test is more accurate than any
of the component detectors from which it is
derived.
StegExpose (the free open source download)
was run on a batch of 27 image files that were
encoded using the OTP-Steg software. Test
specifications and results are shown below.
None of the embedded files were detectable
above the preset default threshold. Standard
fusion was the test run which consists of all of
the specific steganalysis tests mentioned above.

Table 4
StegExpose Steganalysis Test Specifications.

Test Spec

Embedded Text File:
Images:

Description

U.S. Constitution; 52,782 Bytes Unicode (422,256 bits)
27 Various landscape PNG photos, 1200×797 pixels (956,400 pixels) Nikon D90.

Uncompressed:

Approximate Bits per Pixel (bpp) 0.442 bpp

Compressed (zLib):

Approximate Bits per Pixel (bpp) 0.086 bpp

Alterations:
File Archive:

1.445% LSBs altered, 4.335% of pixels
http://199.175.52.196/OTP-Steg/USConstitution/

Table 5
StegExpose Steganalysis Test Results using "Standard Fusion" test.
File name

Above Stego Threshold?

Primary Sets

Chi Square

00247.png

FALSE

0.023408176

0.003533645

null

0.020185798

0.015709206

02155.png

FALSE

0.068625394

0.019360332

null

0.044946323

0.044310683

02664.png

FALSE

NaN

5.03E-13

null

0.086586661

0.043293331

03090.png

FALSE

NaN

0.00370119

null

0.237370882

0.120536036

03164.png

FALSE

0.136200359

0

null

0.022823646

0.053008002

03504.png

FALSE

NaN

0.003639508

null

0.197240313

0.10043991

03509.png

FALSE

0.120022314

0.001400793

null

0.035957938

0.052460348

04031.png

FALSE

0.004125309

3.57E-04

null

0.043804029

0.016095494

04095.png

FALSE

NaN

0.00743453

null

0.099196152

0.053315341

04164.png

FALSE

NaN

0.018406899

null

0.076743739

0.047575319

04378.png

FALSE

NaN

4.83E-04

null

0.179587058

0.090035137
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File name

Above Stego Threshold?

Primary Sets

Chi Square

Sample Pairs RS analysis Fusion (mean)

04479.png

FALSE

0.047114348

0.001832157

null

0.061520437

0.036822314

04637.png

FALSE

NaN

3.57E-04

null

0.093757705

0.04705742

05169.png

FALSE

0.030743209

3.57E-04

null

0.037141532

0.022747301

05255.png

FALSE

NaN

3.57E-04

null

0.112451207

0.056404175

05262.png

FALSE

0.018022058

0.002062878

null

0.010998531

0.010361155

05777.png

FALSE

0.017279631

6.59E-13

null

0.00706503

0.008114887

06202.png

FALSE

NaN

4.25E-04

null

0.093641174

0.047033017

06672.png

FALSE

0.06420808

0

null

0.064583463

0.042930515

07134.png

FALSE

0.03542274

3.57E-04

null

0.017337435

0.017705773

07140.png

FALSE

NaN

0.001423654

null

0.165817881

0.083620768

07946.png

FALSE

NaN

1.02E-11

null

0.072127587

0.036063794

08145.png

FALSE

0.033316358

2.77E-04

null

0.023061286

0.01888482

09061.png

FALSE

0.014700003

0.004850409

null

0.025382546

0.014977653

09252.png

FALSE

0.074362745

7.14E-04

null

0.01319539

0.029424144

09431.png

FALSE

0.040878552

0.003281354

null

0.031193448

0.025117784

09988.png

FALSE

0.062680713

3.54E-04

null

0.054694774

0.039243301

Test Results Summary: Zero (0%)
steganalysis detections using the "Standard
Fusion" detection algorithm in StegExpose
software.
StegExpose can be downloaded
https://github.com/b3dk7/StegExpose.

here:

CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a complete
One-Time Pad encryption and steganography
system, including all software necessary to
complete practical communication. We have
compiled recommended best practices and
identified potential security levels. Finally, we
have tested the software using robust state-ofthe-art steganalysis techniques and found the
low payload threshold maintained in the
software produces a high margin of
communication security safety. No payload
files were detected (0% detections), despite
each file containing the entire content of the
U.S. Constitution as embedded text.
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